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THE CEPTACLE HYPOTHESIS.

The Law of Ceptacle.

Any thing is everything in an inverse ratio of the power of consciousness to separate or distinguish itself from the inseparable or indistinguishable.

THE word "Ceptacle," which is here applied to the hypothesis proposed, has been coined, out of necessity, in order to express a new idea or thought. We already have in use the word "thing," so broad and comprehensive that up to the present time it has been sufficient, with it, to refer to any existing entity as—"thing." All philosophy and all science has found this word equal to its needs. Or, to speak more properly, consciousness has had no thought broad enough to require a more all inclusive symbol for any entity. The necessity which calls for the word "Ceptacle" comes out of the fact that the books at least disclose no law or principle that will give it vitality. Whoever will give this subject their thought must have the patience needed to grope for a while in a dark land until he sees the light which the Ceptacle conception affords. For nearly twenty years has the writer been trying to open the way, some few years ago saying the same thing in print, in a very unsatisfactory way, even as he is now saying it. The effort must be to comprehend, if it be possible, this truth, that: there is a principle in nature out of which human consciousness can develop or evolve that which the word "thing" in its broadest, most comprehensive and largest possible sense cannot and does not contain. It is as if we had reached the ultimate limit in any direction of *any* "thing," as that word expresses it, and that at

this limitation of entity this principle accounting for "Ceptacle" unfolds a beyond.

This Ceptacle principle is to be found in the *peculiar nature of a ratio* existing throughout nature, where all is in a state of flux, or elasticity, and not an equilibrium, as it were, wherein nature is a relationing or proportioning of relatives which we now know as "things." The nature of this *ratio* between relatives is sufficient to account for any entity as a unit and yet for every entity as the many; sufficient to establish any difference between any entities and equally sufficient to hold in one unyielding grasp the whole as an inseparable unity. Whoever follows this "Ceptacle" thought is expected to go one step beyond any "thing" as now known, and by an unfolding consciousness of the *ratio* which any such "thing" has in its broadest relation, there to find a Ceptacle.

In this particular example given below in an endeavor to acquaint the reader with the hypothesis, its application is made to the "thing" called Matter, and the *ratio* of the *relation* existing between Matter and Mind, whereby Matter or Mind while being "things" in their common acceptance are much more where as "Ceptacles" they are being inseparably the same.

If mental or natural philosophy and this Ceptacle Hypothesis be each true, they must be found consistent at all points where their application to each other is made; but, if at any point in the application they seem not to agree, it must remain to be proven in which the error exists.

In testing the truth of this Hypothesis, the Ceptacle Principle involved should be applied to well-settled and accepted facts and not theories or speculations. Therefore the text-books on the science of natural and mental philosophy should be used, and not books arguing in support of assumed facts not yet scientifically accepted. It is not even to be assumed that all that has been accepted by science and incorporated into its text-books is unquestionably true, but that these books contain such facts as have been accepted as representing the consensus of opinion of what is true.

Our question is not what either matter or mind is or how either material or mental facts are possible; or, being possible, how

they coincide with this or that theory; but, instead, recognising that there are material things and mental things which are accepted as the foundation facts upon which natural and mental science build themselves and without which there could be no human experience, our purpose is to learn whether this Hypothesis will make such accepted facts more reasonable, and make more clear that problem of "the one and the many" which confronts philosophy.

This Hypothesis does not assert as new the principle that "things" are related to one another, or are inseparably related, but that they have that relation in inverse ratio of sameness and difference; it does make the claim that a thing itself consists of relatives and is itself a relative, and adds that the *nature of the ratio* between these relatives will explain both their Separability and Inseparability.

Science and philosophy have thus far exhaustively defined a "thing" as "any separable or distinguishable object of thought, whatever exists or is conceived to exist as a separate entity whether actual, possible or imaginary, animate or inanimate, concrete or abstract, any existence or event." The deduction assumed in this Hypothesis is that this definition only partially describes any "thing." To this accepted definition should be added this fundamental Ceptacle Principle; that a "thing" consists of relatives and is itself a relative, where in each relation there is a ratio of difference between the relatives greater than any given sameness, and a ratio of sameness greater than any given difference. So that, completing the definition according to this Hypothesis:

A Ceptacle is any separable or distinguishable object of thought; whatever exists or is conceived to exist as a separable entity, whether actual, possible or imaginary, animate or inanimate, concrete or abstract, any existence or event; having the further principle determining its nature, that it consists of relatives and is itself a relative where the ratio between the relatives is from a sameness greater than any given difference to a ratio where the difference is greater than any given sameness.

All matter is defined in its broadest sense as occupying space; while an idea or thought can not in any sense be defined as occu-

pying space. Science and philosophy both accept the position that matter and mind, as two separate entities, differ in this fundamental fact. Now, these definitions may be accepted as true as far as they go, and will answer for a partial and superficial purpose in identifying them; but according to our Hypothesis, they can not be so defined in a scientific and philosophic sense if they are to be tested in their ultimate truth. It is only a half-truth to say that matter does, and mind does not occupy space, for while this is true where the ratio of their difference is a definable or determinable one, there is a ratio concomitant with this (the other half of the truth) where they occupy the same space and where the ratio of their sameness is greater than any given difference. This seems paradoxical, but it can be explained to reason and will disclose a principle of existence applicable to all things.

What can be set up in its own identity as a thing can also be made to disclose an inhering concomitant which can also set up an identity of its own which proves to be its antithesis. The principle in the Hypothesis must be adequate to the unity of difference without its insistence upon an infinity belonging to it too great to destroy its sameness in any finite expression as any "thing."

EXAMPLE OF A CEPTACLE.

Let us illustrate with an orange:

Thus, when we observe a particular round body, of two or three inches in diameter, of a reddish yellow color, and with a peculiar unevenness of surface, and awakening certain associations of taste and smell, instead of being merely conscious of certain impressions, we perceive an orange; and in doing so we become aware of an external object, and at the same time we combine into one idea of that object the shape, and size, and color, and roughness, and taste, and smell, thinking these not as elements of thought in our mind, but as belonging to the orange.

Now this orange, as matter, occupies space and has the different elements of shape, size, roughness, color, acidity, pungency, etc.: Within the necessary distance is a human being who experiences the

sensations of seeing, feeling, smelling, and tasting in relation to the orange.

In the language of science, what can now occur is explained as follows:

We are not only capable of experiencing these sensations awakened within us by impressions from without, but we can also, through such impressions, perceive external objects.

That is, science would say that the "we" or "ego," which is mind and does not occupy space, perceives the orange, which is matter and does occupy space, and that this ego and this orange are entirely separate and different, the ego, mind, having no part in the orange matter space, and the orange matter having no possible part in the conscious "we" or "ego" that is perceiving it. That each in its last analysis, and in the principle which will account for its nature as a thing, is definable and determinable as separate from the other.

To which this Hypothesis dissents and replies: Granting, as true, for this case, and as is perfectly permissible, that the orange was, before any human being saw it or knew it to be, that it was possessed of all of its elements of shape, size, color, roughness, acidity, and odor, that these were "being," related to each other in a given order in space, occupying the whole of that orange space, in that particular manner which gave it that particular shape, size, roughness, etc., or in other words, this space held a particular degree of color, acidity, odor, etc., which made this particular orange; that it was also being in its relation to other things surrounding it; that it was having its duration in time as related to past, present, and possible future; that all this was true of this orange up to the instant that the human ego enters upon our problem; now, with the coming of this ego, what occurs? First another form of matter, consisting of the human body, enters as a factor—it is itself matter, occupying space, and in that respect only differs from the orange in the kind of matter. It possesses the added phenomenon of being in a peculiar way impressionable, of being acted upon from without. This body, "as matter," is not the "ego," which thinks and

has ideas, although it seems to be an unquestioned fact that the body is a necessity to the ideas, and thoughts, and perceptions, and that whatever the ego is, it is through and with the body that it is capable of experiencing sensation, which is awakened within the body by impressions from without the body, and that it can also, through such impressions, perceive that external object (the orange), and perceive it, not as within but as external to the body.

In the perceiving of this external object, the orange, what occurs, as nearly as science enables us to answer, is this: The body is capable of being impressed by contact with the elements of the orange through the intervening material mediums accounting for feeling, which feeling is diversified into touch, taste, sight, and smell, but so far as this contact in itself is concerned, it is but a contact of one form of matter with another. It is only as it results in experience, sensation and perception that becomes ideas and thoughts. It is true that it does result in these, but when it does so result, what does this experience, these sensations, and this perceived orange prove to be as these ideas and thoughts? The orange in its own identity, as a material thing, as it was having its being, before it was related in any way to this thinking phenomenon, was in no wise dependent upon it for its own entity. It was being its several elements of form, size, unevenness of surface, and those accounting for its color, taste, pungency in their relation to each other in the space they occupied independent of any ego. It was being an entity of single separate elements in space in the form or fact of an occupancy of that orange space. It was being this particular orange thing also as a spatial fact related to its environment. It was so existing without a human being in any relation to it at all. Upon the coming into this relation, however, of a human body and with it the phenomena, sensation, impression, perception, expression, consciousness, as ideas and thought, what has actually occurred? What has been added to creative expression? For our reply we again accept the best scientific statements upon the structure of the mind.

The human faculties are capable of experiencing sensations awakened by impressions resulting from the contact or merger of

exterior matter with that of the human body. This exterior matter, in this case the orange, being a unity of elements in the sense that they occupy a given space, but incapable in this condition as that orange apart from that human relation of being more than its separate elements in a material unity in that particular space, the phenomenon which develops with this human is the capability, the possibility of that unity consciously knowing its *unity* by consciously *being* the process or activity of unifying itself. Here the unrealised capability has actually *become*, is being by being a knowledge of the process of unity unifying its elements. Ideas which are thoughts in this process think this orange as the orange itself, external to that human body, thinking them as *in* the source that awakened the impressions. This *process* is itself now as real as that material was before this evolution. The activity which expresses itself now as the unifying consciousness of that material unity is enabled to become such by an enlarged relation of the orange, reaching out to where it includes the human phenomenon. Consciousness thereby *becomes*. What already has been as possibility before this consciousness is now become itself as this new phenomenon, which proves to be the orange itself in a larger relation which has unfolded the *real existence* of these orange elements and their unity. This real existence was a necessity to the orange before the human relation entered. Its *conscious* realisation is essential only to the human phenomenon. The consciousness of *real existence* is what has evolved. It is these experienced sensations of which the orange is an example which constitute human *being*, and this orange experienced in this particular instance is the spatial dimension and phase of that being.

The different element attributes of the orange, its color, roughness, form, size, and whatever else is needed of material elements to make it what it is, make it an orange without human consciousness being a necessity to it. It can be and is unified by the principle of being its own relatives, but when human consciousness does become a relative, it *evolves* one of these heretofore unevolved relatives into its difference through a new phenomenon. The intelligence that is attributed ordinarily to consciousness only is not

in consciousness only; it is and *was* in the orange before it was human intelligence, but then it was having both its relatives only within the orange; the ratio of difference within itself as phenomenon was not sufficient to evolve the variations. It was a unity, but without consciousness of itself within that limitation; it had no perspective, as it were, it could not within its limitations get a measure of itself or reflect upon itself. What then occurs according to science is, that every element in that orange is in an *unbroken* material contact through the other elements up to and including the brain. Sensation results, but sensation is only the unbroken contact of the elements *in* the orange which nature has found a way for projecting into their wider relation, where their succession or order in space and duration in time as they are in the orange, is having this wider relationing. This new relation evolves the inhering difference; because the new phenomenon of sensation, thought, mind, whichever it may be called, does not act in the same ratio in this evolved phase that is the ratio between the relatives when limited to the orange only. With the human brain in the limitation the ratio between these elements can be separated as a succession through these succeeding impressions of which the brain is capable. The succession through these new phenomena proves to be a process, for it is the difference of that inert or sameness in the orange, but it is the process of the orange, and because it is occurring where the orange is now being also its exterior relative, it is therefore where the ratio is a *given* difference, and in which this other relative, as that difference, can also set up an identity. In this particular relation we call that identity consciousness. If we call one matter, the other in this particular difference can not be matter, and we call it mind; or, in language, we classify one as noun, really because it evolved only substance in its limited ratio of sameness; the other as verb, because we can predicate process or change out of the ratio from one to the other. A wheel at its center is apparently at rest, at another part is an apparent solid. It is the same wheel in the same motion, where within a given range and where the spokes and space are seen, it is neither at rest nor a solid. The explanation, as we know, is a matter of

ratio accounting for a sameness and difference in one fact, and yet science can truthfully rest itself upon the principle that a solid must be to science what the wheel is in its apparent solidity, and that rest is what rest is at its center when in either the ratio is beyond its given. Nevertheless, any such solid has space and any such rest has motion.

What we are endeavoring to demonstrate in this application of the Hypothesis is, that the most common material thing cannot be limited and described as its own entity only, notwithstanding such a description has been satisfactory to science and philosophy. Knowledge has already progressed sufficiently to add to such material description elements inseparable to it while being its difference. This Hypothesis recognises the apparent paradox. It makes no attempt, either in this induction or others to follow, to eliminate the paradox; on the other hand, it is because it is seen to exist in all things that the purpose is to find the principle, if there be one, underlying all things which will explain this paradox and make it consistent in human reason, and to do this the line which it is following is this: The present universally accepted method of determining or defining any "thing" in its own identity or integrity is to confine such thing to quality or qualities, quantity or quantities, relation or relations, mode or modes which are in time and space identical or measurably so: That the elements which make up the thing are virtually alike to the extent at least that a different element does not enter into that identity or the integrity of such thing. Now to this universal method this Hypothesis takes no exception save that while these elements of sameness thus used to define such things are there, it is equally true, whether paradoxical or inconsistent with accepted methods, that already conscious knowledge has advanced in its development to where no exhaustive definition or determination of a "thing" can be given without the recognised presence of a quality, or quantity, or relation, or modality which can not be likened to these other elements and can neither be eliminated from nor confined to that same space and time, yet are an inseparable part of the identity and integrity of such "thing," and without which it cannot exist. The paradoxical, the apparently in-

consistent conditions which nature has always thrust upon reason, the antithesis of things, has been a problem from the beginning to both science and philosophy. The method of meeting the difficulty has not been to accept what has been so evident as a part of nature and readjust our reasoning, but instead to retain our system of logic, to insist, for instance, upon no new adjustment of the point of view of ego as to itself, and attempt either to eliminate the paradox or ignore the antithesis or to call the unexplainable a negligible quantity. This Hypothesis seeks to find a place for the so-called paradox, for this antithesis, this negligible, although to do so it assumes that reason must readjust itself and logic find new rules by which to assert itself. Because matter and mind as related to each other have been at the very foundation of the difficulties, the battle-ground of controversy, our demonstration of the Hypothesis begins with the application of material things where they have appeared fundamentally inconsistent in their relations to mind.

We began with matter occupying space—this as related to the orange elements of shape, size, roughness, etc., environed by other matter. Through the medium of this other matter, now usually considered to be the atmosphere, its radiation and vibrations, or else by direct contact, impression was made upon, through or in another form of matter called the human body, whereby was evolved or developed an entirely new phenomenon—conscious self—the power of combining as that self all of those separate elements in space into a unified entity. Not as something new in themselves, but a larger relation of something already existing, evolving the *power of self-realisation*. This is ego, but here it only adds knowledge to existence. In this particular relation it is mind, and while this mind is not matter in any of the forms given to matter and will not permit of a scientific classification as matter, yet when it appears it is as an inseparable relative; where in their *sameness* is needed the very same space for an exhaustive analysis of either. For the same identical space by which the orange is determined and defined is necessary to what proves to be mind, and in this relation in their sameness the ratio between them in that sameness of space is greater than any given difference. The Hypothesis being tested

does not take the position that the statement is erroneous which defines matter as occupying space, that is, as those elements that co-exist in space, but that this is but the definition of the unity of this matter as one of its relatives and that no exhaustive definition can be given, after the human enters, which does not include the unifying as the other relative. That when this relative is included it will prove to be a sameness wherein the ratio is greater than any given difference, which sameness we are endeavoring to demonstrate where mind is the relative of the orange. This demonstration is, however, but a part of the principle disclosed in the Hypothesis where it further asserts that in this same relation of matter and mind in this same space these relatives, matter and mind, are in a ratio of difference which is greater than any given sameness. This orange, called matter, consists of elements occupying space in measurable quantity, but it is the unifying of these elements and not the elements in their unity which is the orange, and this unifying element is not the matter accounting for the orange. This unifying element will unify any other thing, as well, of entirely different elements, and yet this unity consists of these two differing relations, while in this relation their ratio of sameness is greater than any given difference for the reason that neither one in this relation can be eliminated in their occupancy of the same space, nor can either be described in this orange without the other in any exhaustive description. That the unifying element in the course of evolution becomes mind is only a step forward in creative expression; the principle is the same as a basic fact related to the orange thing itself, without the mental evolution.

We began the application of the Hypothesis in this particular instance to this statement, "All matter is defined in its broadest sense as occupying space, while an idea or thought cannot in any sense be defined as occupying space." What has been shown by the Hypothesis is that the "thinking principle," contrary to accepted belief, may be extended and in its true state as a related instead of an unrelated principle can be and is known where it is being its form and location. It has space relations, contrary to prevalent assumptions.

This orange, consisting of matter, occupies space.

These ideas and thoughts prove to be a unifying of this same matter in this same space.

In this spatial relation, matter and thought are inseparable relatives, having a ratio of sameness between them greater than any given difference.

A definition or description of either matter or thought confined to one of these relatives is not a complete definition and is not in accord with the scientific or philosophical knowledge of the day; and to so confine it is inconsistent with such knowledge.

PROP. I. Matter and mind in an inseparable sameness occupy the same space.

SECOND APPLICATION.

Matter and mind, which in an inseparable sameness occupy the same space (PROP. I), as related to that space have a ratio of difference between them greater than any given sameness.

Matter and mind are both extended and may be so related (PROP. I) that either is determinable by the same space, and while in that relation neither can be defined or determined except by that particular spatial fact. Yet the paradox must be true, according to the Hypothesis here set up, that related to this same space and sameness, there is a difference between this same matter and thought where the ratio of that difference is greater than any given sameness.

Now, any given matter elements in a given space, being unified by or through related thought (PROP. I), must have that particular relation as one existing fact in a given present time as related to any past or any possible future. That "given present" is the duration of that particular relation in that given space, yet within this "given," change is taking place according to scientific assumption, for science is agreed that there is no such thing as the absolutely constant in matter. "All things are growing or decaying, accumulating matter or wearing away, integrating or disintegrating." The Hypothesis asserts that there must be a paradoxical or apparently inconsistent principle involved in what will account

for the existence of the orange; where two relatives, which can be identified separately as matter and thought, nevertheless merge the elements of one with the unifying process of the other so that their merging is to a sameness where the ratio of that sameness is greater than any given difference. Nevertheless the principle in the Hypothesis requires that the same two relatives in that same space shall have a ratio of difference greater than any given sameness. Through PROP. I, the condition is shown to prevail asserted in the first phase of the principle; it is the unity of variety in the unifying of a variety of elements, but it is existing in a given space (as the orange). It *is* that orange, it is the one dimension, as it were, in time, a present orange, which is the unified of those particular matter elements, but as we have learned from science there is no such thing as the constant in matter, then that matter relative cannot exist longer than it is *being* that "given" present in that particular specific relation, while the other or thought relative in this same particular relation is constant in that it unifies the succession of this *being* with what *becomes* as a result of change. It is the other phase of the principle. It becomes, as it were, a second dimension, in time. To this thought relative, but not to the matter relative, it *is* the orange, as well as it *was* the orange. Therein lies the fact that between inconstant matter and related enduring thought there is the ratio of difference greater than any given sameness, and yet the same unifying thought can no more be separated from either the past or the present relations than can the same matter be present in the change. If what are treated as facts in this application are true as set out in PROP. I, as well as in PROP. II, the Hypothesis undertakes to account for those facts upon the principle that the material fact can only exist as matter when merged with that which can nevertheless be defined or determined as another entity, and where that merger is in a degree of ratio between these two greater than any difference, and further that, once this merger is established, there will be found in one of those relatives a difference where the ratio of *that* difference between them is greater than any given sameness. That is, there appears to be a reasonable explanation for the paradox of a sameness which will

produce variety, which in this second application gives us the variety or difference existing in the first application and enables us to state:

PROP. II. Matter and mind have a ratio of difference between them, as related to the same space, greater than any given sameness.

We find such statements constantly confronting us as the following (James's *Psychology*):

"According to the assumptions of this book, thoughts accompany the brain's workings, and thoughts are cognitive of realities. The whole relation is one which we can only write down empirically, confessing that no glimmer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this is the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort the consciousness and of what sort the knowledge may be."

As heretofore stated, in developing this Hypothesis, both material and mental "things" will be assumed as existing facts, as science and philosophy have found and classified them for their purposes; as, for instance, it accepts:

"Matter as that which occupies space or is extended, and with which we become acquainted by means of our bodily senses or organs," and that "mind is self-conscious intelligence, possessing rational power of self-determination; or more widely—specially from a physiological point of view—to include such recognition of external objects as is provided for through the special senses as related to the cerebrum."

If, therefore, the mystery to be explained, as pointed out by Professor James, is how brains as matter are possible, or how a knowing consciousness as mind can be an actuality at all, then so far as this hypothesis goes it must remain a mystery, but if these actualities are accepted as unquestioned existing phenomena, definable as indicated, then the hypothesis is intended and expected to point out a law of cause and effect which will explain how "brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness."

In Proposition I there were certain several matter elements such as color, form, etc., which, as matter either separately or together, can best be defined or determined when they are simply

asserted to be extended or occupying space. In the further development of Proposition I it was stated that these several matter elements were *unified*.

We have here two distinctly differing things, the one definable as material substance, that is extended and occupying space, the other an activity, a process, the existing or being of the first as a unifying, being, or process of that extension. The Hypothesis holds that it is because it is a difference between these two, that because there is an opportunity or stress present in any "thing," that such thing, in its own identity, with such inhering stress between sameness and difference, constitutes a cause which must of necessity produce as effect that which is an identifiable difference. Therefore, in this instance or relation matter gives rise to consciousness. What accounts for this is a *never-ceasing* relationing of relatives in a ratio which discloses a concomitant integration and disintegration of identity,—a never-ceasing interchange of what in the Hypothesis is called sameness and difference. It must not be assumed that in any given induction possible to be made these changing identities can all be followed any more than it is possible for all nature to be known. But it should be assumed according to the Hypothesis that every identity will have an inhering difference beyond any possible given ratio of sameness sufficient to be cause for the effect indicated.

In the Hypothesis what is called a sameness between the relatives does not mean that a difference does not exist in that relation, but no *given* difference exists, none can be determined or defined. It is where in nature the ratio between the relatives has not yet been pushed back upon itself, from out of which any difference must come. An analogous case in principle where consciousness is a factor is where a base can not be had large enough in a triangle by which, with the present mechanism for measurement of the angles, there can be found but parallel lines on the two sides pointing to some fixed star. The principle of sameness and difference, it must be understood, is within *any* thing; as, for instance, an assumed indivisible atom. This atom must by this very principle itself consist of relatives, though, as in the case of any such ulti-

mate in consciousness, it only appears to that consciousness in its aspect of sameness and not that of its difference, because, again, as the Hypothesis would hold, the ratio in such "thing" between the relatives is yet where the sameness is greater than any given difference, and not yet where any nature phenomenon has evolved a vantage by which to disclose the ratio of difference which nevertheless does exist. For here we should again note, which we can not too often repeat, that the principle upon which this Hypothesis proceeds is that *every* thing consists of relatives and is itself a relative, and that the ratio in any relation is *from* sameness *to* a difference with a concomitant relationing of difference to sameness, where the *given* is the definable or determinable limitation at either extreme, and that this "given" is itself a thing like the rest, subject to the same principle. If within one relative that principle will permit its being a thing which can set up its own identity and prove itself to consist of relatives, then it would seem as if the principle would be sufficient to establish a method whereby with that other identified relative the unity of difference and the difference in unity throughout nature would become reasonable. It will be seen, however, that to do this requires, what this Hypothesis assumes must follow, that human understanding should no longer define any "thing" in its last analysis except as a relative where its known or unknown difference is a part of any complete definition or determination.

In the illustration cited, the wheel taken as its whole might be said to be involved in a movement upon its own sameness and difference where this fact discloses a principle in such movement which becomes a cause accounting for two apparently opposite or contradictory effects, for in one relation the effect is what science classifies as a solid occupying all the space at a given center, while in the other relation it is motion; that is, it is in fact the same principle as duration or succession in time. Now, the application of the Hypothesis to Professor James's difficulty of "knowing consciousness," as, for instance, a knowing consciousness of the orange, would be in some such manner as this: The elements in the orange as related to themselves when the orange is being its own relatives,

are to each other being in one and the same instant, with no *given* difference in a related duration in time, but when this sameness becomes a relative in its evolved and larger phenomena, then in their impress upon the brain the succession of that impression becomes a given difference and no longer a given sameness.

OREN B. TAFT.

CHICAGO, ILL.